## APPENDIX A

## Hypothetical partial offer - AB wants $50.1 \%$ of XYZ Ltd

AB holds or controls $19.99 \%$ of the voting rights in XYZ Limited, a Code company. AB wishes to increase its voting control to $50.1 \%$ by way of a partial offe (please note that although this example is based on the scenario at Figures 1 and 2, it applies some different assumptions )

| Share register - XYZ Ltd |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| Name Num held \% held <br> AB $19,990,000$ $19.99 \%$ <br> C $10,000,000$ $10.00 \%$ <br> D $7,000,000$ $7.00 \%$ <br> E $20,000,000$ $20.00 \%$ <br> F $25,000,000$ $25.00 \%$ <br> Others $18,010,000$ $18.01 \%$ <br>    <br> Total $100,000,000$ $100.00 \%$ |  |  |


| Calculate specified \% | as num | as \% |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| Desired holding | $50,100,000$ | $50.10 \%$ |
| less current holding | $19,990,000$ | $19.99 \%$ |
| Total sought ("TS") | $30,110,000$ | $30.11 \%$ |
|  |  |  |
| Total voting rights | $100,000,000$ | $100.00 \%$ |
| less current holding | $19,990,000$ | $19.99 \%$ |
| Total not held or | $80,010,000$ | $80.01 \%$ |
| controlled by $A B$ ("TNHC") |  |  |
|  |  |  |
| Sperified \% (TS / TNHC) = | $\mathbf{3 7 . 6 3 \%}$ |  |

Total acceptances
Total number of XYZ shares in respect of which $A B$ receives acceptances for its partial offer

| If all hold directly |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Name | No. acceptances | as \% of total held |  |
| C | $10,000,000$ | $100.00 \%$ |  |
| D | $3,500,000$ | $50.00 \%$ |  |
| E | 0 | $0.00 \%$ |  |
| F | $20,000,000$ | $80.00 \%$ |  |
| Others | $15,000,000$ | $83.29 \%$ |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Total | $\mathbf{4 8 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0}$ | $60.62 \%$ |  |


| If C, D, \& E hold through nominee ("CDE Nom") |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Name | No. acceptances | as \% of total held |
| CDE Nom | 13,500,000 | 36.49\% |
| F | 20,000,000 | 80.00\% |
| Others | 15,000,000 | 83.29\% |
| Total | 48,500,000 | 60.62\% |
| CDE Nom underlying acceptances |  |  |
| C | 10,000,000 |  |
| D | 3,500,000 |  |
| E | 0 |  |

## Stage 1 of scaling process ("S1")

AB takes up lesser of either:
(a) $37.63 \%$ OR
(b) actual no. accepted

| Name | No. taken up | Name | No. taken up |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| C | 3,763,280 | CDE Nom | 13,500,000 |
| D | 1,317,148 | F | 7,526,559 |
| E | 0 | Others | 5,644,919 |
| F | 7,526,559 | Total S1 | 26,671,479 |
| Others | 5,644,919 |  |  |
|  |  | CDE Nom underlying S1 take up |  |
| Total S1 | 18,251,906 | C | 10,000,000 |
|  |  | D | 3,500,000 |
|  |  | E | 0 |

Stage 2 ("S2")


| If C, D \& E hold through nominee |  |
| :--- | ---: |
| AB's total sought | $30,110,000$ |
| less S1 take up | $26,671,479$ |
| Total further required ("TFR") | $3,438,521$ |
|  |  |
| Total acceptances | $48,500,000$ |
| less S1 take up | $26,671,479$ |
| Excess acceptance pool ("EAP' | $21,828,521$ |
|  |  |


| Name | No. left (S1) | Further take (S2) | Total take (ভ |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| CDE Nom | 0 | 0 | $13,500,000$ |
| F | $12,473,441$ | $1,964,869$ | $9,491,429$ |
| Others | $9,355,081$ | $1,473,652$ | $7,118,571$ |
|  |  |  |  |
| Total | $21,828,521$ | $3,438,521$ | $\mathbf{3 0 , 1 1 0 , 0 0 0}$ |

Compare results holding directly vs. holding by nominee

| Name | Total acceptances | Take up if direct holding |  | Take up if nominee holding |  | Difference direct vs. nominee |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | No. of total | \% of total | No. of total | \% of total | No. of total | \% of total |
| C | 10,000,000 | 6,208,247 | 62.08\% | 10,000,000 | 100.00\% | 3,791,753 | 37.92\% |
| D | 3,500,000 | 2,172,887 | 62.08\% | 3,500,000 | 100.00\% | 1,327,113 | 37.92\% |
| E | 0 | 0 | 0.00\% | 0 | 0.00\% | 0 | 0.00\% |
| F | 20,000,000 | 12,416,495 | 62.08\% | 9,491,429 | 47.46\% | -2,925,066 | -14.63\% |
| Others | 15,000,000 | 9,312,371 | 62.08\% | 7,118,571 | 47.46\% | -2,193,800 | -14.63\% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

[^0]
[^0]:    If we assume $A B ' s$ offer prices is $\$ 1.00$ per share, shareholder $C$ is $\$ 3,791,753$ better off as a result of its securities being held by a nominee, than if C held its securities directly on the XYZ share register. Conversely, shareholder F is $\$ 2,925,066$ worse off by virtue of the distortion caused by not looking through the holding of CDE Nom, than in the scenario where $\mathrm{C}, \mathrm{D}$, and E hold their securities directly on the register.

